



Indeterminate Punishment-Constitutional Law.-Miller y. State, 49
N. E. (Ind.) 894. An Indiana act provides that in cases of felony, where the de-
fendant is between certain years, the jury shall merely find his age and the crime
of which he is guilty, and that the power of fixing the amount of punishment
shall be in the hands of managers of the reformatory to which the criminal is
sentenced. Held, that-this does not deprive the accused of a trial by jury.
Held, further, that the act is not unconstitutional as allowing persons charged
with executive duties to exercise judicial functions, since the power conferred
on the managers is purely administrative.
Second Offense-Evidence.-Peofile v. Sickles, 50 N. Y. Supp. 377. A
New York law provides that conviction for a second offense shall be punish-
able more heavily than for the first. Held, that if a person is indicted under
this law the first offense must beproved at the trial, although itis admitted be-
fore the impanelling of the jury since its proof is a material part of the allega-
tion. The introduction of evidence of the first offense by the state is not con-
trary to the rule preventing evidence of character to be introduced except by
accused.
Comjounding a Misdemeanor.-State v. Carver, 39 AtL .N. H.) 973.
Defendant, for thirty dollars, agreed in writing "to withdraw all further ac-
tion against F. for illegal sale of liquor," in contravention of New Hampshire
statutes and destroyed the evidence he had thereof. Held, that compounding
a misdemeanor is an offense at common law and that a person may be con-
victed thereof, "though no offense liable to a penalty has been committed by the
party from whom the reward is taken."
COPYRIGHT AND TRADE-MARKS.
Co;yriglt-Pubicaion--Dehositing Cofiy in Library.-J'ewelers' Mer-
cantile Agency v. Jewelers Weekly Pub. Co., 49 N. E. (N.Y.) 872. Plaintiff fur-
nished book relating to his trade to all who cared to subscribe under the con-
tract that the books were only loaned, the title remaining in the plaintiff, and
were to be returned at a fixed time. Plaintiff also deposited two cbpies of the
book with the Librarian of Congress. Defendant used part of the material in
the book. Plaintiff sued to enjoin on the ground that the book had never
been published under the common law meaning of the term. Held, that in
issuing the books to the subscribers the plaintiff had lost his exclusive prop-
erty in it and that this constituted a publication. The deposit of two copies
with the Librarian. was also held to be a publication, although no copyright
was secured.
Trade-mark- 'Royal" may show Origin and Profirietorshi,'h-Aban-
donment.-Raymondv. Royal Baking Powder Co., 85 Fed. Rep. 231, affirming
powder Co. v. Raymond, 70 Fed. Rep. 376. A labelor trade-mark which, though
distinctive, contains false statements calculated to mislead cannot be the sub-
ject of property. While the word "royal" may be descriptive of quality, yet
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when applied to the whole output of a concern it may show origin and proprie-
torship. The contention that it does not will not be favored when maintained
by one manifestly seeking to impose his wares on the public as the manufac-
ture of another. After abandoning for twenty-five years the use of a fraudu-
lent label, one cannot resume it to impose his wares on the public as the man-
ufacture of one who has established a legitimate business under a similar
label.
Basis of Right of Trade-mark-Priority- Use-Invention.- Tetlow v.
Tatitan, 85 Fed. Rep. 774. Held, that the right to the exclusive use of a
trade-mark or device does not rest on absolute priority of use or invention, but
on such continued use as to make it point out the origin or source of the partic-
ular goods.
INSURANCE.
Fire Insurance-Iron Safe Clauses-Books of Account-Substantial
Comlliance.-McNutt v. Virg,-inia Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 45 S.
W. Rep. (Tenn.) 61. Complainant held a fire insurance policy under which he
was required to take an inventory at least once a year, and to keep a complete
set of books, and to keep suea books and iuventory in an iron safe except dur-
ing business hours; and which provided that failure to produce such books And
inventory in case of a loss should constitute a bar to any recovery thereon. On
the day before the fire complainant in taking a new inventory, in the same book
with other inventories, inadvertently left the book out of the safe, and it, with
current invoices, was destroyed. Held, in an action to recover on thd policy,
that when complainant produced duplicate invoices and showed beyond question
the true status of his accounts and of his stock destroyed, he was entitled
to recover, on the ground that he had shown a substantial compliance with
every reasonable requirement of such policy. This case is at variance with
Laudman v. Insurance Co., i9 Ins. Law J., 572, where it is held, that this
clause should be enforced, and that it was not a sufficient defense to show the
custom of the insured to keep the books of his business in an iron safe -as stip-
ulated, but by accident or oversight on the particular occasion the precaution
was omitted.
Insurance-Increase of Hazard- Waiver of Forfeiture.-Alston v.
Greenwich, 29 S. E. (Gh.) 266.-An insurance policy contained the con-
dition that policy would be void if the hazard should be increased by any
means within the knowledge or control of the insured. A part of the insured
store was rented to a tenant who largely increased the amount of hay stored
therein. Held, Atchinson J. dissenting, that this constituted an increase of
hazard, and that an inference to the contrary by the jury could not fairly be
drawn. Also, the contract being valid, the policy could not be retained from the
insured by the agent of the company. Therefore a delivery of the policy to
the insured by the agent after loss was not a waiver of forfeiture for increase
of hazard, though the agent had notice of the facts; neither was a partial ap-
praisement of the loss a waiver.
LIBEL AND SLANDER.
Libel- Words Actionable ter se.-American Book Co. v. Gates, 85 Fed.
Rep. 729. To publish of a corporation that the list of books in which it deals "con-
tains some of the most disgraceful trash," that it puts out-of-date school
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books in "frontier" or "backwoods" states, and that "books that are referred
to nowadays as a laughing stock by intelligent teachers are foisted upon whole
states for a series of years;" held, to constitute an actionable libel. Libelous
matter regarding the method of transacting one's business is actionable with-
out the allegation of special damage.
Libel and Slander- Words Actionable fier se.-Sguires v. State, 45 S. W.
(Texas) 147. To send out a circular letter purported to be issued and
signed by a nominee for office, and directed to the opposing party, wherein the
nominee is represented as renouncing the principles of the party which he is
openly espousing, and advocating those of the opposing party and requesting
its support; held, to constitute libel, as calculated to bring such nominee
into contempt of honorable persons, but not as representing him to be a person
unworthy of holding public office.
MISCELLANEOUS.
Game-Contract for Storage During "Closed Season"- Validity.-
Haggerty et al. v. St. Louis Ice Manufacturing and Storage Co. 44 S. W.
(Mo.) 1114. Where a statute prohibits the killing of certain game a.
certain times of the year, and further makes it a misdemeanor for any person
to have in his possession during the "closed season" any of the specified
game; held, that a contract to store such game during the "closed season"
and to re-deliver it at the beginning of the "open season," -was void and could
not be enforced. Sprague v. Rooney, 104 M o. 360, 16 S. W. Rep. 505.
Agency-Contract of Agent with Third Party.-Culver v. Nester, 74
N. W. (Mich.) 532. An attorney with the knowledge and assent of his client
made a contract with a third party by the terms of which he was to receive a
commission if he brought about an auction sale by order of court of certain
property in litigation claimed by his client, and the third party succeeded in
buying the property at or below a certain price. Held, not void as in restraint
of free bidding, as the third party was not restricted to the price named. The
assent of the client who apparently wished the attorney to get his pay from
the commission rather than to pay him directly prevents the contract from
being void as bringing the interests of principal and agent into conflict.
Constitutional Law-Due Process of Law-Compensation for Corporate
Franchises.-Newbury#ort Water Co. v. City of Newburyport, 85 Fed.
Rep. 723. A statute under which a water company is in effect compelled to
convey its plant to a city under threat of municipal competition, and which
provides that in case the parties could not agree as to the price to be paid, the
Supreme Court might appoint a commission to determine the value of said
property, but such value to be reckoned "without enhancement on account of
future earning capacity or good will, or on account of the franchise of said
company;" held, to be void as providing for the taking of property without
due compensation. The fact that the company elected to sell under this stat-
ute, and petitioned the court to appoint the appraisers, held not to preclude it
from maintaining a bill in a Federal court to test the validity of the statute.
Equity-Mistake of Law-Constructive Notice.-Kelly v. Ct. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 59 N. .Y. Supp. 139 Testator had made a policy payable to his son
and then changed it, making it payable to his legal representatives. The son,
.as executor, had distributed the proceeds of the policy to the estate's creditors,
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with knowledge that the former policy had been issued to him personally.
Held, that the son could not recover on the former policy, though he did not
know that at the time it was in existence, since the mistake was one as to his
legal rights. The thing to be known was whether the policy had been legally
issued and not its continued physical existence. Held, further, that if com-
pany's agent had told the son that the former policy had never been issued,
but gave him full access to the books, he was chargeable with notice of the
issue of the former policy, since an ordinarily prudent man could have apprised
himself of the fact.
Interstate Commerce-Regulations.-Peofile v. Warden of City Prison,
5o N. Y. SuA5. 56. The laws of New York prohibit the sale of tickets by
persons not the authorized agents of the carriers, and empower the purchase
by the agents of given lines of tickets over other lines for through transporta-
tion. .teld, that these laws are valid and are not an attempted regulation of
interstate commerce. They do not in any way affect the fact of transportation
or interfere with a passenger seeking to make a contract of transportation,
but are merely an exercise of the police power for the protection of travellers.
Dizorce.-Olson v. Olson, 74 N. W. (Wis.) 543.-A judgment of divorce
on the ground of desertion, which was for the interest of both parties, willnot
be disturbed where there is evidence to the effect that the defendant was com-
pelled to leave the plaintiff by reason of his cruel and inhuman treatment, but
the answer fails to allege such fact or any fact as counter-claim.
Legal Tender-Mutilated Bank Note.-North Hudson County Ry. Co.
v. Anderson, 39 Atl. Rep. (N. J.) 9os.-Plaintiff brought suit for damages for
being ejected from defendant's car, claiming that he tendered the conductor a
dollar bill, from which a piece one inch and a quarter by one inch and a half
had been torn on the upper left-hand corner. Held, not a valid tender, as
there was absent a part of the bill by which the conductor might be aided in
determining its genuineness. The rules of the Treasury Department with re-
gard to the redemption of mutilated notes relate simply to redemption, and do
not make such notes legal tender. The case is distinguished from that of
R. R. -Co. v. Morgan, 52 N. J. Law 6o, i8 Atl. 904, when a genuine silver
coin, worn smooth by use, was held to be a legal tender.
Wills-ConstructionLafise of Legacies-Religious Bequests- Valid-
ity.-Kerrigan v. Taft et al., 39 Atl. Rep. (N. J.) 7,or. Held, that a legacy
to a priest, to be expended for masses for the repose of testatrix's soul, is a
charitable, and not a superstitious use, and valid under the Federal and State
constitution relating to freedom of conscience and religious belief. Const. U.
S. Amend. I.; Const. N. J.. Art. I., §§ 3, 4. Such a legacy creates a trust,
which does not lapse on the death of the trustee before the testatrix, but wlll
be carried out by the appointment by the court of another trustee. Compare
to the same effect, Hoeffer et al. v. Clogan et al. (Ill.), decided February 14,
1898; and In re Zimmerman's Will, 50 N. Y. Supp. 395. For a case uphold-
ing such a bequest on the ground that it was an absolute gift, and not a trust
which was void for uncertainty of beneficiaries, see Harrison v. Brofihy et al.
(Kan.), cited on p. 279, Vol. VII., YALE LAw JOURNAL.
National Banks-Assessments-a:Enforcement.-Hulitt v. Bell, 85 Fed.
Rep. 98. An assessment on notice from the comptroller of the currency in
accordance with Rev. St., q 5205, is optional with the corporation, and is for
